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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
LOCAL 345 BROTHERHOOD OF UTILITY
WORKERS OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.
-and-

NEW ENGLAND POWER SERVICE COMPANY
-X

The Undersigned, duly designated at the Board of Arbitration
in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
The

Company

discontinue

should
or modify

not

be • required

its lower

rates for Local 345 BUW employees.

to

tier wage
The two

tier wage rates may be maintained.

EricXj. Schmertz, Chairman

DATED:

May 13, 1998

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Chairman
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

DATED:

May

, 1998

William F. Dowd, Concurring

DATED:

May

, 1998
May Rose Dickhaut, Dissenting

-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
LOCAL 345 BROTHERHOOD OF UTILITY
WORKERS OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.
-andNEW ENGLAND POWER SERVICE COMPANY

The stipulated issue is:
Should the Company be required to discontinue
or modify its lower tier wage rates for Local
345 BUW employees or should the two tier wage
rates be maintained?
A

hearing

was

held

on

December

1997

in

Milford,

Massachusetts at which time representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer

argument

evidence

witnesses.
Union

and

and

to

examine

and

cross-examine

The Arbitration Board consisted of Ms. Mary Rose Dickhaut,

designee,

Mr.

William

F.

Dowd,

Company

designee,

and

the

Undersigned as Chairman.
The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived; the parties filed
post

hearing

briefs;

and

session on March 17, 1998.

the

Arbitration

Board

met

in executive

The authority for this arbitration is found in a memorandum
of agreement negotiated by the parties as part of the 1995 contract
negotiations.
It reads:
"A

joint

Union/Management

consisting

of

three

Committee

management

and

three

union representatives from the Local 345 will
employ a mutual-gains bargaining approach to
resolve issues associated with the two-tier
wage system.

In so doing, the parties agree

to attempt to find solutions
mutually

that will be

agreed upon by the Union and the

Company.

All

participants

in

this

joint

effort will be trained in the methods and
process

of

mutual-gains

bargaining.

A

consultant may be used to aid the process.
If agreement cannot be reached by 12/31/95,
the issue will be submitted to arbitration.
Increases in wage rates, if any, awarded by
the arbitration decision shall be effective
as of the date of the decision without any
retroactivity.
Board

of

In reaching a decision, the

Arbitration

shall

consider

the

market rates paid for comparable work, the
Company's competitive position, the interests
of the Company's rate payers and stockholders
and

issues

associated

with

the

potential

deregulation of the Company's business."
The issue(s) of the two tier wage system was not resolved by
"mutual-gains

bargaining,"

and

the

dispute,

as

set

forth

in the

stipulated issue was submitted to arbitration before this arbitration
board.
The
establishment

history

of

the

two

tier

system,

its

original

as part of the 1980 collective negotiations, and its

continuation through the subsequent successor contract negotiations of
1982, 1984, 1986, 1989, 1992 and 1995, are well-known to the parties
and need not be generally recited herein, except where necessary in
support of this Opinion.
At the arbitration hearing, as was reiterated in the briefs,
the parties agreed that in addition to the specific factors set forth
in the second paragraph of the foregoing memorandum, the Arbitration
Board may consider other factors that it deems relevant.
In that latter regard the Union argues that the Board should
change what has been used as the "market rates paid for comparable
work "from a comparison with the rates paid workers at a variety and

mixture of employers in the Company's geographic area, to a narrower
comparison with wage rates of similar or related classifications of
other utility companies only.
Though the record indicates that the Company's wage rates
are generally competitive with a general
geographic

area,

a comparison

mix of employers

with wages paid by other

in the

utilities

would, again generally, place the Company on the low side.
Also, as factors

to be considered, the Union argues that a

revocation of the two tier system would end a "divisiveness" between
employees of both tiers; would accord to the lower tier employees a
recognition that after many years of service (18 for some) their job
experience
with

the

and expertise had reached a level warranting wage parity
upper

approximately

tier;

the

de

minimus

expense

to

the

Company

of

$159,000 annually to elevate the 34 service clerks of

the bargaining unit from the lower level to parity with 46 clerks of
the

same unit

at the higher tier, and that that cost, even with

indirect additional expenses, is certainly affordable considering the
$1.6 billion the Company will receive from the planned sale of its
generating plants; that other divisions or departments of the Company
have eliminated two-tier systems; and that finally (in its brief) the
Union asks the Board for "guidelines" under which, by mutual agreement
the two-tier

system

could be ended by direct negotiations

parties.

4

of the

In my judgment, for an arbitrator to legislate a change in
or an end to a two-tier wage system which was negotiated some 18 years
ago

and

which

has

been

contract negotiations
to

end

retained

a number

of

subsequent

(albeit with unsuccessful attempts by the Union

it) , the Arbitrator

significant

through

should

find persuasive

evidence of a

change(s) in the circumstances on which the system was

originally founded and/or on which it remained based over the years
subsequently.
Based on the record before me I am not satisfied that there
have been the requisite significant or sufficient changes

in those

circumstances which would support the Union's instant case.

Indeed, a

single significant

change in circumstance which I find has occurred

supports the Company's case for retention of the two-tier system.
I conclude that the "market" referred to in the memorandum
is the "market" that the parties utilized when the system has agreed
to in 1980 and which has remained the market throughout the succeeding
eighteen years.
While a de novo case can be made out justifying
limited
market,"

to other utilities,
together

with

the

the long-standing practice
unrefuted

and

current

a market

of an "area

evidence

that

employees in this bargaining unit perform duties essentially the same
as employees

similarly

classified

(or relatedly classified) among a

variety of employers in the area, leads to the conclusion that there

has been no significant change in the "market" to warrant what would
be

a

radical

change

from

the

incumbent

market

to

the

different

"market" the Union now seeks.
The Union concedes that if confined to the balance of the
factors

set

forth

in paragraph

2 of

the

memorandum,

supportive of the two-tier system would be expected.

a

decision

So there is no

need for me to determine if any of them have significantly changed.
Specifically, the concession notwithstanding, the record does not show
new

or

changed

circumstances

which,

if

the

two-tier

system

was

eliminated, would be favorable to the "stockholders, rate payers, (to)
the

Company's

competition

position

or

(to)

issues

associated

with...deregulation."
The Union's arguments that the lower tier employees have
acquired

the

experience

minimus"

costs

to

the

and

skills justifying

Company

are

parity

respectively

and

the

"de

unsupported

by

probative evidence. And because of contrary evidence from the Company,
is indeterminative, at best.
conclude
acquired

generally
experience

While, of course, it is logical to

that veteran employees
and

skills

in the

comparable

to

lower

tier have

those

similarly

classified on the higher tier, the evidence does not show especially
which employees are involved, how long they have been employed, how
their skills have been improved and how many have or have not acquired

6

"veteran" status.
speculative.

So, primarily as argument, this assertion remains

(But, as an aside and as a "guideline," may be relevant

to further negotiations on the issue).
To the Union's reference to the ending of two-tier systems
at other divisions or departments, the Company's reply is both more
telling and perhaps prophetic

(i.e. for negotiations), and that is

that in those instances the two-tier systems were ended through bilateral, quid pro quo bargaining.

But a change by negotiations, with

apparent offsetting bargaining exchanges, is not a precedent for an
arbitral ordered change, nor, therefore, is it a significant change in
and

from

the

circumstances

over

the years

since

the

system

was

installed.
That the cost of creating parity between the tiers may be
insignificant

is again

relevant

to negotiations,

but

arbitration because it has not been adequately proved.

not

to this

To the Union's

bare statistical assertion the Company replies, without refutation,
that the costs cited by the Union are "only the tip of the iceberg";
that there are still a substantial number of other employees on lower
tiers of two-tier systems not in this bargaining unit for and from
whom

there

would

be

pressure

for

similar

substantial additional costs to the Company.

wage

adjustments

at

In short, though neither

party offered adequate evidence on this point, the Union's argument
falls

short

of meeting

its burden of proof

on such

an important

economic factor.
Similarly, the Union's argument that the $1.6 billion the
Company will receive from the sale of its generating facilities would
easily support the cost of eliminating the two-tier system, is also
not supported by enough economic evidence of a probative nature.

For

again, in the face of the Company's reply, the Union's assertions fall
short

of meeting its burden.

The Company explains, again without

refutation, that the $1.6 billion will be used to "pay down debt" and
to grant legislatively required rate reductions.

It points out that

with the sale of its generating plants, it will experience a sharp
drop in income and that there will be no surplus remaining from the
$1.6 billion sale.
any)

on

these

I am not satisfied with the economic evidence (if

points

by

either

side.

That

leaves

the

matter

inconclusive at best and clearly not up to the evidentiary level of
the kind of significant change I have required.
"Divisiveness" between employees of the two-tiers is not a
new

circumstance.

The

facts

indicate

that

"divisiveness"

concern in 1980 when the system was negotiated.
the

system

for

"new hires"

(or the

was a

The Union accepted

"unborn") in exchange for the

Company's willingness to drop its application to incumbent employees.
The Company states that at the time that compromise was reached, the

Union said that it "would take the flack" (from the new hires) .

So

from the outset the possibility of "divisiveness" was well within the
Union's

contemplation,

and

therefore

is not

and

has

not

been

a

"change" of significance.
However, from the record, I see one significant change that
is favorable to the Company's position.

It is the recent legislated

(1997) deregulation and restructuring of the electric utility industry
in

Massachusetts.

The

Company

states

that

the

Massachusetts

Department of Public Utilities ("DPU") requires the Company to justify
the reasonableness

of its wage rates by comparing them not only to

other utilities but to non-utility employers in the geographic areas
where the Company does business.

For the Company to recover Union

payroll

adjustments in its rates it must demonstrate that any such

payroll

adjustments

and

wage

rates

are

"reasonable."

And

that

"reasonableness" requires a "minimization of unit-labor costs."
In point, the Company cited the DPU's disallowance of two
million dollars

in Union compensation expenses

in 1995 because the

Company had not shown that the compensation expenses for those wage
rates were compared to positions paid by non-utility companies in the
Company's service territory.
In short, the Company concludes that if it raised the wage
levels of the lower tier employees to a competitive level of other

utilities only, and ignored the non-utility market in its geographic
area,

its

applications

for

recovery

of

those

new

costs

by

rate

adjustments would be rejected by the DPU.
This is not to say that I agree with that assertion and
conclusion.

Rather it is to say that it is a legitimate and bonafide

factor and a new circumstance which at least supports the Company's
claim for retention of the present two-tier system.

As a factor

unrefuted and unchallenged by the Union, it cannot be ignored by the
Arbitration Board.
Finally, the Union asks for "mutually agreed to guidance"
for a "negotiated end -to the two-tier system."
reach

or

even

consider

authority to do so.

any

such

because

we

lacked

the

But the Chairman believes that in this Opinion he

has provided same observations
guidance."

approach

The Board did not

that could be interpreted as "dicta

In any event, it is my conclusion that further efforts to

change or eliminate the two-tier system and the credible equitable
arguments

advanced

by

the

Union

are

for

bi-lateral

negotiations

between the parties, and not arbitration.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA -ANDNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
V

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

OPINION AND AWARD

and

NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The issue is:
Did the Employer violate Sections 33 and
34

of

the

Collective

Agreement

by

inserting

complaint

in

the

ANTHONY MORELLI?

a

Bargaining
letter

of

file

of

personnel

If so, what shall be

the remedy?
The Union's grievance in this case is premature.

Articles 33

of the contract comes into play when an employee has been discharged or
suspended.

That has not occurred in this case.

The letter of complaint

placed in Mr. Morelli's personnel file has not been acted upon by the
Employer by the imposition of any discipline on Morelli.

When and if the

letter becomes a basis for discipline, whether a warning, suspension or
discharge, then its probative value, its allegations and its evidentiary
use may be triggered, and at that point it may be fully challenged by
Morelli and the Union on his behalf.

For the foregoing reason, I do not find the Union's objection
to the placing of the letter in Morelli's file, to be a "grievance"
within the meaning of Section 34 of the contract.

The mere placing of

the letter in the file, does not, in my view, give rise to a substantive
claim of a violation of the "meaning or application of the provisions of
(the) Agreement."
Rather, at this stage, with no action adverse to Morelli having
been taken by the Employer, the Employer has exercised a managerial
prerogative to put the letter in Morelli's file.

The evidence indicates

that this is consistent with the Employer's practice to put all letters
from the public, complaining and complimentary in the files of the
employees involved.

Also, the Employer explained that in this instance,

again pursuant to its practice, it notified Morelli about the letter and
offered him an opportunity to respond to it.

I think that good labor

relations would suggest that if an employee is so notified, similar
notifications be given the Union, as the employee's bargaining
representative.

And I would advise that that be done in the future.

But

the instant omission from doing so, again in the absence of any action
against Morelli does not yet rise to the level of a contract breach or a
grievance.
However, I wish to make it clear, as I believe I did at the
hearing, that as the Impartial Chairman, I find that at present the
letter in Morelli's file is non-prejudicial to him, and of no probative
value nor is it evidence critical of him.
At present, the'substance of the letter has not been validated
or substantiated, nor apparently, even investigated.
Morelli's concern and the objections of the Union.

I appreciate
But at this point and

at this stage, this Impartial Chairman will attach no worth to the letter
and no inferences adverse to Morelli will or should be drawn.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:
The Employer did not violate Sections 33
and 34 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement by inserting a letter of
complaint in Anthony Morelli's personnel
file.

.JUL.

Eric J". Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

March 27, 1998

STATE OF NEW YORK
ss :
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA -ANDNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

OPINION AND AWARD

and
NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of RENE GOMEZ? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 27, 1998 at which time
Mr . Gomez, and representatives of the above-named Union

appeared.

All

concerned

were

afforded

full

and Employer

opportunity

to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Mr. Gomez, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" was
discharged for assaulting a fellow employee (Danny Roopchand).

He

denies the charge.1

Though not so unequivocally. When asked if he had physical contact
with Roopchand, he replied "not that I remember."
1

The record persuades me that the grievant committed the
offense; that forcefully he pushed employee Roopchand against a wall in
the body shop during working hours; and that the attack was unprovoked.
Also, I find that Roopchand suffered injury to his arm and neck for
which he sought and obtained medical treatment.
I accept as accurate and credible the testimony of Roopchand
and that of Richard Johnson, the Employer's assistant superintendent of
maintenance.

I find that in response to Roopchand's request that the

grievant move his bus out of a bay in the body shop so that it could be
replaced by Roopchand's bus, the grievant, angrily and violently thrust
Roopchand into the shop wall and against a protruding pipe.

I so

conclude not just because of Roopchand1s testimony, but from the
testimony of Johnson to whom Roopchand reported the incident shortly
after its occurrence and who saw and testified to Roopchand's injuries.
Johnson stated that he saw abrasions on Roopchand's arm and redness and
later swelling on his neck and face.

Johnson also testified that he

treated Roopchand by applying water to those injuries.
Not only is there no evidence in the record why Johnson would
falsify that testimony, but the proximate time between the incident and
Johnson's observations and treatment of Roopchand's injuries is
probative evidence of the grievant's assault.

That Roopchand may have

returned to work for a while after the incident is not, in my view,
evidence that the assault did not take place.

At some point, before

his shift ended, the grievant left, stating that he was going to the
doctor.

The evidence indicates that with the passage of some time

Roopchand's face swelled, prompting him, I believe to decide to get
medical attention.
Johnson also testified, significantly, I conclude, that when
he questioned the grievant following Roopchand's report to him, the
grievant was "out of control," "yelling, screaming, slamming his hands
on the wheel of a bus" and "gunning its engine."

And that when asked

if he "slammed" Roopchand against the wall, the grievant responded that
he "was sick and tired of Danny (i.e. Gomez) running his mouth and
telling him what to do and where to go" and that "that's why I pushed
him."

I deem this to be an admission of the assault by the grievant,

and I accept as credible that testimony by Johnson.
That there may be some ambiguity in the written statement of
Dr. Isaac Belizon regarding when he treated Roopchand is not
sufficiently relevant to the credibility issue before me to cast doubt
on the foregoing conclusions.
Nor is the evidence of other "assaults" in this employment
setting, which the Union point to and rely on in asserting a defense,
alternative to the grievant's denial, of uneven and disparate treatment
of the grievant.
Two such incidents were pointed to in which the participants
were not discharged.

One between the aforesaid Johnson and the brother

of Anthony Simone, the vice president for maintenance.
between persons named "Sperry" and "Stevenson."
years ago.

And the other

Both were at least 10

No details of these fights were presented in this record.

I cannot tell if they were initiated or provoked by either participant,
nor can I tell which was the "aggressor," if either.

One, apparently

was between two managerial employees and therefore does not serve as a
precedent for bargaining unit disparate treatment.

That leaves one

other, which cannot constitute "condonation" by the Employer or a
precedent for this case because the testimony is that it "was not
reported to management."

And one incident standing alone, is hardly a

practice, policy or precedent.
Based on the record, I find not only that the grievant
assaulted Roopchand, but that the grievant was the aggressor.

And that

a request to "move his bus" is not a provocation to justify a physical
response.
It is well settled that a physical altercation of this type,
under these facts, taking place on the Employer's property during
working hours, and especially where injury results, is grounds for
summary discharge.
I find no mitigating circumstances.
term employee.

The grievant is a short-

His continued "rage" after the incident places in fatal

question his stability and suitability to return to work in the body
shop.

Whether, if the grievant "purged" himself of his denial of
the assault and gave meaningful promises to conduct himself properly on
the job he could be returned to work for a final chance, is a matter
entirely within the sole discretion of the Employer.

As those

circumstance were not part of this case, they are not matters for this
arbitration.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of Rene Gomez was for
just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

March 27, 1998

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

SS :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA -ANDNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD

LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
and
NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The issues are:
1.

Was there just cause for the discharge
of RENE GOMEZ? If not, what shall be the
remedy?

2.

Did the Employer violate Sections 33 and
34

of

the

Collective

Agreement

by

inserting

complaint

in

the

Anthony Morelli?

a

Bargaining
letter

of

file

of

personnel

If so, what shall be

the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 27, 1998 at which time
Mr.

Gomez, and representatives of the above-named Union

appeared.

and Employer

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence

and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Gomez Grievance

Mr. Gomez, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" was
discharged for assaulting a fellow employee (Danny Roopchand).

He denies

the charge.1

Though not so unequivocally. When asked if he had physical contact
with Roopchand, he replied "not that I remember."
1

The record persuades me that the grievant committed the
offense; that forcefully he pushed employee Roopchand against a wall in
the body shop during working hours; and that the attack was unprovoked.
Also, I find that Roopchand suffered injury to his arm and neck for which
he sought and obtained medical treatment.
I accept as accurate and credible the testimony of Roopchand
and that of Richard Johnson, the Employer's assistant superintendent of
maintenance.

I find that in response to Roopchand's request that the

grievant move his bus out of a bay in the body shop so that it could be
replaced by Roopchand's bus, the grievant, angrily and violently thrust
Roopchand into the shop wall and against a protruding pipe.

I so

conclude not just because of Roopchand's testimony, but from the
testimony of Johnson to whom Roopchand reported the incident shortly
after its occurrence and who saw and testified to Roopchand's injuries.
Johnson stated that he saw abrasions on Roopchand's arm and redness and
later swelling on his neck and face.

Johnson also testified that he

treated Roopchand by applying water to those injuries.
Not only is there no evidence in the record why Johnson would
falsify that testimony, but the proximate time between the incident and
Johnson's observations and treatment of Roopchand's injuries is probative
evidence of the grievant's assault.

That Roopchand may have returned to

work for a while after the incident is not, in my view, evidence that the
assault did not take place.

At some point, before his shift ended, the

grievant left, stating that he was going to the doctor.

The evidence

indicates that with the passage of some time Roopchand's face swelled,
prompting him, I believe to decide to get medical attention.

Johnson also testified, significantly, I conclude, that when he
questioned the grievant following Roopchand's report to him, the grievant
was "out of control," "yelling, screaming, slamming his hands on the
wheel of a bus" and "gunning its engine."

And that when asked if he

"slammed" Roopchand against the wall, the grievant responded that he "was
sick and tired of Danny (i.e. Gomez) running his mouth and telling him
what to do and where to go" and that "that's why I pushed him."

I deem

this to be an admission of the assault by the grievant, and I accept as
credible that testimony by Johnson.
That there may be some ambiguity in the written statement of
Dr. Isaac Belizon regarding when he treated Roopchand is not sufficiently
relevant to the credibility issue before me to cast doubt on the
foregoing conclusions.
Nor is the evidence of other "assaults" in this employment
setting, which the Union point to and rely on in asserting a defense,
alternative to the grievant's denial, of uneven and disparate treatment
of the grievant.
Two such incidents were pointed to in which the participants
were not discharged.

One between the aforesaid Johnson and the brother

of Anthony Simone, the vice president for maintenance.
between persons named "Sperry" and "Stevenson."
years ago.

And the other

Both were at least 10

No details of these fights were presented in this record.

I

cannot tell if they were initiated or provoked by either participant, nor
can I tell which was the "aggressor," if either.

One, apparently was

between two managerial employees and therefore does not serve as a

precedent for bargaining unit disparate treatment.

That leaves one

other, which cannot constitute "condonation" by the Employer or a
precedent for this case because the testimony is that it "was not
reported to management."

And one incident standing alone, is hardly a

practice, policy or precedent.
Based on the record, I find not only that the grievant
assaulted Roopchand, but that the grievant was the aggressor.

And that a

request to "move his bus" is not a provocation to justify a physical
response.
It is well settled that a physical altercation of this type,
under these facts, taking place on the Employer's property during working
hours, and especially where injury results, is grounds for summary
discharge.
I find no mitigating circumstances.
term employee.

The grievant is a short-

His continued "rage" after the incident places in fatal

question his stability and suitability to return to work in the body
shop.
Whether, if the grievant "purged" himself of his denial of the
assault and gave meaningful promises to conduct himself properly on the
job he could be returned to work for a final chance, is a matter entirely
within the sole discretion of the Employer.

As those circumstance were

not part of this case, they are not matters for this arbitration.

Issue #2
The Union's grievance in this case is premature.

Articles 33

of the contract comes into play when an employee has been discharged or
suspended.

That has not occurred in this case.

The letter of complaint

placed in Mr. Morelli's personnel file has not been acted upon by the
Employer by the imposition of any discipline on Morelli.

When and if the

letter becomes a basis for discipline, whether a warning, suspension or
discharge, then its probative value, its allegations and its evidentiary
use may be triggered, and at that point it may be fully challenged by
Morelli and the Union on his behalf.
For the foregoing reason, I do not find the Union's objection
to the placing of the letter in Morelli's file, to be a "grievance"
within the meaning of Section 34 of the contract.

The mere placing of

the letter in the file, does not, in my view, give rise to a substantive
claim of a violation of the "meaning or application of the provisions of
(the) Agreement."
Rather, at this stage, with no action adverse to Morelli having
been taken by the Employer, the Employer has exercised a managerial
prerogative to put the letter in Morelli's file.

The evidence indicates

that this is consistent with the Employer's practice to put all letters
from the public, complaining and complimentary in the files of the
employees involved.

Also, the Employer explained that in this instance,

again pursuant to its practice, it notified Morelli about the letter and
offered him an opportunity to respond to it.

I think that good labor

relations would suggest that if an employee is so notified, similar
notifications be given the Union, as the employee's bargaining
representative.

And I would advise that that be done in the future.

But

the instant omission from doing so, again in the absence of any action
against Morelli does not yet rise to the level of a contract breach or a
grievance.

However, I wish to make it clear, as I believe I did at the
hearing, that as the Impartial Chairman, I find that at present the
letter in Morelli's file is non-prejudicial to him, and of no probative
value nor is it evidence critical of him.
At present, the substance of the letter has not been validated
or substantiated, nor apparently, even investigated.
Morelli's concern and the objections of the Union.

I appreciate
But at this point and

at this stage, this Impartial Chairman will attach no worth to the letter
and no inferences adverse to Morelli will or should be drawn.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:
1.

The discharge of Rene Gomez was for just
cause.

2.

The Employer did not violate Sections 33
and 34 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement by inserting a letter of
complaint in Anthony Morelli's personnel
file.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

March 9, 1998

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
________________________________________
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The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer
discharge

ROSA

have

just

CONDE?

If

cause to
not,

what

shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on April 9, 1999 at which time Ms.
Conde,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

and

representatives of the above-named Employer and Union appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
Having

duly heard the proofs

and allegations

of the

Union and the Employer, the Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under
the collective bargaining agreement between said parties, makes
the following AWARD:
1 . The grievant shall be reinstated to
her

job

as

a

Cleaner,

as

of

Wednesday, April 14, 1999;
2 . Said reinstatement shall be without
back pay.

The period of time from

her discharge to her
shall be a suspension;

reinstatement

3. Attached

hereto

and

made

a

part

hereof is a diagram of the storage
areas on the Employer's property.
The

two

storage

areas,

in

which

buses are cleaned, are identified as
Area A and Area B;
If

one

of

the

three

cleaners

assigned to Area A is absent,,

the

grievant, who is regularly assigned
to Area

B,

shall

be

permitted

to

work in Area A;
4. If

there

among

the

is

a

Area

permanent
A

vacancy

cleaners,

the

grievant will be transferred to Area
A, and regularly assigned there.
A new hire will be assigned to Area E

Eric J. y£chmertz, Impartial^ Chairman

DATED:

April 21, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION & AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
.

^

"V

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate paragraphs 18
and 19 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement by refusing to permit LESTER
GAYLE and PAUL THOMPSON to operate
express buses from
March 1, 1999 until their reemployment
by the Company?1 If so, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 18, 1999 at which time
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

memoranda.
Gayle and Thompson, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants" or as "Gayle" or "Thompson" were Board of Education
school bus drivers who were "decertified" in December 1998 as
school bus drivers and suspended from further Board of Education

GAYLE was reemployed April 24th and THOMPSON was reemployed June
11th . Both as express bus operators.

1

work by the Board's office of Pupil Transportation.

In

accordance with the collective bargaining agreement the Company
held first level hearings on December 18th and 22nd for each
grievant respectively on their suspensions by the Board of
Education.
It is the Company's position that following that first
level hearing, both grievants were suspended by the Company from
all Company work pending the outcome of an investigation by the
Board of Education of charges against them.
In February 1999, a "pick" commenced for express bus
work to

begin March 1st.

The grievants tried to exercise their

seniority in this "pick" but were denied the opportunity by the
Company on the grounds that they were "suspended" and ineligible
for any work with the Company.

The Union grieved that denial.

The Company asserts that that grievance is not
arbitrable because it is barred by the time limits of the
grievance procedure, namely that:
"All requests and appeals for a second
level hearing must be submitted by the
Union in writing....within ten regular
working days after the date of the
decision at level one or the decision
at level one shall be deemed
accepted..." (emphasis added)
The Company points out that the level one hearings on
the grievants' suspensions took place on December 18th and 22nd
respectively, with the Company's decisions on both submitted to

the Union in writing on each of those dates; that the Union did
not thereafter appeal the decisions to level two.

And that after

ten regular working days elapsed the level one decision was final.
The next action of the Union was its grievance dated March 8, 1999
protesting the Company's denial of the grievants' "pick"
applications.

That grievance, asserts the Company, was a

challenge to the grievants' suspensions.

And as their "suspended"

status precluded their right to "pick," the denial of the "pick"
is not arbitrable because over two months elapsed between the
level one decisions and the grievance.
The Union's position is that the Company did not
suspend the grievants from all its work, but only from Board of
Education driving and that that limited suspension was not
challenged after the level one meeting, making an appeal to level
two unnecessary.

But, the Company's denial of the grievants' pick

of express bus driving constituted a new and separate grievance
that was filed within the prescribed time limits. It argues that
the rights of the grievants to participate in the "pick" did not
accrue until February and that the time for the filing of the
instant grievance did not commence until their "pick" efforts were
denied.
Obviously, both the arbitrability issue and the merits
of this case turn on what the grievants' status was in February,
when the "pick" commenced.

If they were, in fact, suspended by

the Company from all Company work, the denial of the "pick" based

on their suspended status, mooted the grievance.

It was no longer

challengeable because the time limits for appeal from the
suspension decision had expired.
However, if they were only suspended by the Company
from operating Board of Education school buses, they were not and
should not have been precluded from bidding on other Company work,
specifically here, driving express buses.

And, if so, the Union's

grievance on their behalf was timely.
It is appropriate at this point to make clear what is
not decided in this case.

I do not decide whether the Company may

suspend an employee from all its work solely because of that
employee's decertification by the Board of Education or whether
any such full suspension is automatic.

I do not decide whether

the "reasons" the Board of Education gave for its suspensions of
the grievants would constitute per se just cause for the
grievants' suspensions from all Company work, nor can make any
evidentiary determinations on those allegations in the absence in
this case of direct evidence and testimony on them.
decide is narrow.

What I do

It is whether the grievants were or were not in

suspended status from all Company work at the time they tried to
"pick" express runs.
The Company asserts that its decision to suspend the
grievants from all Company work was clear and unambiguous. I am
not so persuaded.
It may well be that the Company intended to suspend the
grievants from all its work pending the investigation, but I am
not persuaded that it conveyed that decision clearly and

unambiguously to the Union or the grievants.

As a suspension is

disciplinary in nature, the Company has the burden not only of
proving just cause but, in this case, proving the unambiguousness
of its decision and the clarity of its communication to the Union
and the grievants.
The testimony at the hearing about what took place at
the level one hearing was contradictory and offsetting.
official minutes of the hearings were submitted.

No

The better

evidence is the Company's written decisions following the
hearings.

And I find those writings to be ambiguous.
The Thompson Hearing Notice and

Results read, in

pertinent part, that the hearing was to be held:
"regarding the suspension of your
certification by the Office of Pupil
Transportation"

(emphasis added).

And was signed by Mike Biondi, the Company's Vice
President.
The Company's decision (i.e. Results) stated, again in
pertinent part, that:
"...the Office of Pupil Transportation
was temporarily suspending Thompson's
certification as a school bus driver
pending an investigation..."
and that:
"Based on this action by the office of
Pupil Transportation NYBS was also

suspending Paul Thompson"

(emphasis added)

and that:
"...depending on the outcome of the Board's
investigation a determination would then be
made regarding Thompson's position with
NYBS"(emphasis added)
A reasonable interpretation of the foregoing, in my
judgement, is that the hearing related and was limited to
Thompson's suspension by the Board of Education from Board of
Education driving; that the Company was affirming the decision of
the Board of Education by "also" (i.e. "similarly") suspending him
from Board of Education driving; that the investigation conducted
by the Board of Education related to Thompson's conduct as a
school bus driver.

And that, therefore, the reference to his

"position" with NYBS to be determined after the investigation was
to the "position" of school bus driver.
In short, in the absence of more probative, clarifying
evidence and testimony about the substance of and discussions at
the level one hearing, I conclude that based on the Hearing Notice
and the Results of the level one decision, the Union and Thompson
had reasonable grounds to believe that the Company's suspension of
Thompson tracked that of the Board of Education and was limited to
Board of Education driving.
I conclude similarly with regard to the Gayle hearing.
The stated subject of that hearing related to the Gayles conduct
as a school bus driver (i.e. "duties and obligations regarding
passing a note to a 12 year old girl").

In the Results, the Company (Thomas J. Sharkey) stated
that:
"...the matter is out of our hands and
was passed up to a higher level at the
Board of Education."

(emphasis added)

And it went on to state:
"We informed Gayle that we are
suspending him from NYSB pending
completion of an investigation."
Again, a reasonable interpretation of the foregoing is
that the hearing was confined as a "matter" to Gayles' conduct as
a school bus driver; that his suspension was ordered by "a higher
level at the Board of Education" and that his "suspension from
NYBS" was in that context, namely an affirmation of the action of
the Board of Education, necessitated, as in Thompson's case for
contractual validity, by
Section 33 of the collective bargaining agreement.
Accordingly, I conclude that Gayle and Thompson
retained the contractual right under Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the
contract to bid on express runs for the "pick" commencing March 1,
1999 and that the Company's refusal to permit them to do so was
violative of the contract.

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties
makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated Paragraphs 18 and
19 of the collective bargaining
agreement by refusing to permit LESTER
GAYLE and PAUL THOMPSON to operate
express buses from March 1, 1999 until
their reemployment on April 2^ and
June 1, 1999 respectively.

They shall

be made whole for the time lost.

Eric J^/Schmertz, Impartial Chairman
DATED:

September 3, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION & AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate paragraphs 18
and 19 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement by refusing to permit LESTER
GAYLE and PAUL THOMPSON to operate
express buses from
March 1, 1999 until their reemployment
by the Company?1 If so, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on June 18, 1999 at which time
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

memoranda.
Gayle and Thompson, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants" or as "Gayle" or "Thompson" were Board of Education
school bus drivers who were "decertified" in December 1998 as
school bus drivers and suspended from further Board of Education

GAYLE was reemployed April 24th and THOMPSON was reemployed June
11th. Both as express bus operators.

1

work by the Board's office of Pupil Transportation.

In

accordance with the collective bargaining agreement the Company
held first level hearings on December 18th and 22nd for each
grievant respectively on their suspensions by the Board of
Education.
It is the Company's position that following that first
level hearing, both grievants were suspended by the Company from
all Company work pending the outcome of an investigation by the
Board of Education of charges against them.
In February 1999, a "pick" commenced for express bus
work to

begin March 1st.

The grievants tried to exercise their

seniority in this "pick" but were denied the opportunity by the
Company on the grounds that they were "suspended" and ineligible
for any work with the Company.

The Union grieved that denial.

The Company asserts that that grievance is not
arbitrable because it is barred by the time limits of the
grievance procedure, namely that:
"All requests and appeals for a second
level hearing must be submitted by the
Union in writing....within ten regular
working days after the date of the
decision at level one or the decision
at level one shall be deemed
accepted..." (emphasis added)
The Company points out that the level one hearings on
the grievants' suspensions took place on December 18th and 22nd
respectively, with the Company's decisions on both submitted to

the Union in writing on each of those dates; that the Union did
not thereafter appeal the decisions to level two.

And that after

ten regular working days elapsed the level one decision was final.
The next action of the Union was its grievance dated March 8, 1999
protesting the Company's denial of the grievants' "pick"
applications.

That grievance, asserts the Company, was a

challenge to the grievants' suspensions.

And as their "suspended"

status precluded their right to "pick," the denial of the "pick"
is not arbitrable because over two months elapsed between the
level one decisions and the grievance.
The Union's position is that the Company did not
suspend the grievants from all its work, but only from Board of
Education driving and that that limited suspension was not
challenged after the level one meeting, making an appeal to level
two unnecessary.

But, the Company's denial of the grievants' pick

of express bus driving constituted a new and separate grievance
that was filed within the prescribed time limits. It argues that
the rights of the grievants to participate in the "pick" did not
accrue until February and that the time for the filing of the
instant grievance did not commence until their "pick" efforts were
denied.
Obviously, both the arbitrability issue and the merits
of this case turn on what the grievants' status was in February,
when the "pick" commenced.

If they were, in fact, suspended by

the Company from all Company work, the denial of the "pick" based

on their suspended status, mooted the grievance.

It was no longer

challengeable because the time limits for appeal from the
suspension decision had expired.
However, if they were only suspended by the Company
from operating Board of Education school buses, they were not and
should not have been precluded from bidding on other Company work,
specifically here, driving express buses.

And, if so, the Union's

grievance on their behalf was timely.
It is appropriate at this point to make clear what is
not decided in this case.

I do not decide whether the Company may

suspend an employee from all its work solely because of that
employee's decertification by the Board of Education or whether
any such full suspension is automatic.

I do not decide whether

the "reasons" the Board of Education gave for its suspensions of
the grievants would constitute per se just cause for the
grievants' suspensions from all Company work, nor can make any
evidentiary determinations on those allegations in the absence in
this case of direct evidence and testimony on them.
decide is narrow.

What I do

It is whether the grievants were or were not in

suspended status from all Company work at the time they tried to
"pick" express runs.
The Company asserts that its decision to suspend the
grievants from all Company work was clear and unambiguous. I am
not so persuaded.
It may well be that the Company intended to suspend the
grievants from all its work pending the investigation, but I am
not persuaded that it conveyed that decision clearly and

unambiguously to the Union or the grievants.

As a suspension is

disciplinary in nature, the Company has the burden not only of
proving just cause but, in this case, proving the unambiguousness
of its decision and the clarity of its communication to the Union
and the grievants.
The testimony at the hearing about what took place at
the level one hearing was contradictory and offsetting.
official minutes of the hearings were submitted.

No

The better

evidence is the Company's written decisions following the
hearings.

And I find those writings to be ambiguous.
The Thompson Hearing Notice and

Results read, in

pertinent part, that the hearing was to be held:
"regarding the suspension of your
certification by the Office of Pupil
Transportation"

(emphasis added).

And was signed by Mike Biondi, the Company's Vice
President.
The Company's decision (i.e. Results) stated, again in
pertinent part, that:
"...the Office of Pupil Transportation
was temporarily suspending Thompson's
certification as a school bus driver
pending an investigation..."
and that:
"Based on this action by the office of
Pupil Transportation NYBS was also

suspending Paul Thompson"

(emphasis added)

and that:
" . . .depending on the outcome of the Board's
investigation a determination would then be
made regarding Thompson's position with
NYBS"(emphasis added)
A reasonable interpretation of the foregoing, in my
judgement, is that the hearing related and was limited to
Thompson's suspension by the Board of Education from Board of
Education driving; that the Company was affirming the decision of
the Board of Education by "also"

(i.e. "similarly") suspending him

from Board of Education driving; that the investigation conducted
by the Board of Education related to Thompson's conduct as a
school bus driver.

And that, therefore, the reference to his

"position" with NYBS to be determined after the investigation was
to the "position" of school bus driver.
In short, in the absence of more probative, clarifying
evidence and testimony about the substance of and discussions at
the level one hearing, I conclude that based on the Hearing Notice
and the Results of the level one decision, the Union and Thompson
had reasonable grounds to believe that the Company's suspension of
Thompson tracked that of the Board of Education and was limited to
Board of Education driving.
I conclude similarly with regard to the Gayle hearing.
The stated subject of that hearing related to the Gayles conduct
as a school bus driver (i.e. "duties and obligations regarding
passing a note to a 12 year old girl").

6

In the Results, the Company (Thomas J. Sharkey) stated
that:
"...the matter is out of our hands and
was passed up to a higher level at the
Board of Education."

(emphasis added)

And it went on to state:
"We informed Gayle that we are
suspending him from NYSB pending
completion of an investigation."
Again, a reasonable interpretation of the foregoing is
that the hearing was confined as a "matter" to Gayles' conduct as
a school bus driver; that his suspension was ordered by "a higher
level at the Board of Education" and that his "suspension from
NYBS" was in that context, namely an affirmation of the action of
the Board of Education, necessitated, as in Thompson's case for
contractual validity, by
Section 33 of the collective bargaining agreement.
Accordingly, I conclude that Gayle and Thompson
retained the contractual right under Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the
contract to bid on express runs for the "pick" commencing March 1,
1999 and that the Company's refusal to permit them to do so was
violative of the contract.

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties
makes the following AWARD:
The Company violated Paragraphs 18 and
19 of the collective bargaining
agreement by refusing to permit LESTER
GAYLE and PAUL THOMPSON to operate
express buses from March 1, 1999 until
their reemployment on April 24th and
June 1, 1999 respectively.

They shall

be made whole for the time lost.

Eric J. /Schmertz, Impartial Chairman
DATED:

September 3, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION

between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

-andNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
x

The above-named parties did not stipulate an issue.

Based on the

record before me and my arbitral authority I deem the issue in dispute to
be:
Whether
the
Company
is
contractually
obligated to make a one-time, non-recurring,
lump sum payment to each employee equal to 2%
of the employee' s hourly wage rate in effect
on November 1, 1997, multiplied by two
thousand and eighty-eight (2,088), which the
Transit Authority and Queens Private Lines
granted to their employees in December 1997?
Hearings were held on July 20 and August 12, 1998 at which
time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded

full opportunity

to offer

examine and cross-examine witnesses.

evidence

and argument

and to

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Each side filed a post-hearing brief.
The "lump sum" payment referred to in the issue was granted by
the New York City Transit Authority and the Queens Private Lines to their
employees in December 1997.
due grievants in this case.

The Union asserts that a similar payment is

The

relevant

and

pertinent

contract

provisions

of

the

collective bargaining agreement between the parties are set forth in a
Memorandum of Agreement dated February 5, 1996 and read:
1. WAGES.
A. The

base

hourly

wage

for

all

express

bus

operators shall be as follows:
i.

From December 1, 1995 through September 30, 1997
- $19.01 per hour;

ii.

From October 1, 1997 through November 30, 2000,
the hourly rate shall be increased by the amount
of the average percentage increase in the wages
of the bus operators employed by the TWU "Queens
Private

Lines"

(i.e.,

Queens

Surface,

Triboro

Coach Lines and Jamaica Bus.).
B. The base

hourly

wage

for all

school

bus

operators shall be as follows:
i.

From

December

1,

1995

through

August

31,

1996 - $18.42 per hour;
ii.

From September 1, 1996 through November 30,
2000, the base hourly wage shall be subject
to and limited by the percentage increase in
the hourly rate of pay paid by the New York
City Transit Authority within such period of
time to its bus operators.

C. The base hourly wage for all MIU operators shall
be as follows:
i. From

December

1,

1995

through

August

31,

1996 - $19.01 per hour;
ii. From September 1, 1996 through November 30,
2000,
parity

the base hourly wage shall maintain
with

operators

the base hourly

employed

by

the

wage

New

of

York

bus
City

Transit Authority.
D. The rates of pay covering categories of work set
forth in paragraph 7 of the 1992 Agreement shall
be increased by the same percentage as the wages
of the express bus operators are increased.
E. The base hourly wage of maintenance

employees

shall be increased by the same percentage as the
express bus operators.
The issue for determination is obviously whether the "lump sum"
granted by the Transit Authority and the Queens Private Lines constitutes
a "percentage increase in wages" or a "percentage increase in the hourly
rated

pay,"

respectively

for

express

bus

operators

and

school

bus

operators within the meaning of the foregoing Memorandum of Agreement;
and whether respectively

for MIU operators, maintenance

employees and

hose set forth in paragraph 7, the lump sum" payment is material to
'maintain(ing) parity with the base hourly wage rate of Transit Authority
operators, or an "increase in the percentage of wages" within the meaning
of Sections D and E of the Memorandum.

I conclude that the "lump sum" payment, albeit compensation
for services performed, does not qualify for payment to the grievants in
this case under the foregoing contractual conditions and limitations.
If there is one fundamental and universally settled principle
of arbitration law, it is that the Arbitrator, whose authority stems from
and is confined to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and
who

is

prohibited

legislating

new

from

terms,

changing,

has

an

or

absolute

modifying
fidelity

contract
to

the

terms

or

contract as

negotiated by the parties.
More specifically, where the language of the contract is clear
and unambiguous, the Arbitrator is obliged to enforce it as written, even
if the consequences of doing so may be inequitable, unfair or even harsh.
He must see it as the "bargain" entered into by the parties, and not
substitute for that bargain a different meaning or interpretation that he
may think is more appropriate or even better for the labor-management
relationship.
I have followed this principle for the 40 years I have been
arbitrating.1
"""Some 30 years ago I was confronted with a major, similar case where the
ontract and the equities were in opposition. I upheld the right of the
Sallantine Brewery to go out of business, and, in the most difficult
Dart of the decision, enforced the contract provision that stripped
Ballantine employees (some with lengthy seniority) of their accumulated
non-contributory pensions. The contract expressly and unequivocally
provided that if an employer member of the multi-employer pension plan
went out of business, all the pension credits of his employees would be
redited to the benefit of the remaining employees of the remaining
mployers of the plan. I expressed profound personal disagreement with
this contract provision and personal distress over my obligation to
enforce the "bargain" the Brewery Workers Union and Ballantine
negotiated (in exchange I was told for earlier, higher wage increases) I
stated that I thought enforcement of the contract was unfair,
inequitable and harsh, but that as the Arbitrator I had no authoritative
hoice to do otherwise. I observed (as I will in the instant case) that
the remedy was through collective bargaining, not arbitration, and/or by

Here,

the

critical

contract

provisions

are

clear

and

unambiguous.
The

language

interpretation.
increase(e)

And

is

susceptible

to

only

one

that is that the reference

by...average

percentage

increase

logical

and legal

to "the hourly

in

wages,"

rate

"percentage

increase in the hourly rate of pay," "parity with the base hourly rate"
and "increase (s) by the same percentage"

(emphasis added) all refer to

the hourly rates of pay of the categories of employees covered. Indeed,
each foregoing phrase follows an explicit, fixed amount of an hourly wage
rate for the preceding period of time (i.e. $19.01 per hour for express
bus operators for December 1995 through September 30, 1997; $18.42 per
hour for school bus operators for December
1996; $19.01

1, 1995 through August 31,

per hour for MIU Operators for December

1, 1995 through

August 31, 1996; and parity for paragraph 7 employees

and maintenance

employees with the express bus operators.)
Clearly

therefore,

wage

increases

subsequent

to

October

1,

1997 for express bus operators and after September 1, 1996 for school bus
and

MIU

operators

paragraph
granted

by

(and

7 employees)
the

Transit

any

corresponding

were

contemplated

Authority

and

parity
to be

the

for maintenance
and

Queens

limited

Private

and

to those

Lines

that

increased base hourly rates, or base hourly wages, or were a percentage
increase in base hourly rate of their employees.

. .continued)
legislation.
(A consequence of that decision was the passage by
ongress of the ERISA legislation) , Commentators at the time uniformly
agreed that I had no choice but to decide the case as I did.

There

can be no

serious

dispute

over

the

clear meaning of

increased "base hourly wage" or "base hourly rate of pay."

They mean, of

ourse, the dollars and cents paid employees for each regular hour of
work.

That meaning

public

and

is both a matter of common

professional

practitioners.

An

usage

increase

and

understanding

in the base

usage by the general
by

labor

relations

hourly rate

or a

percentage

increase in the base hourly rate, per force, raises the base hourly rate
to a new, and permanently higher level.
A "lump sum" compensation payment is also well understood.

It

is additional compensation and meets the definition of "wages," but does
not increase a base hourly rate.

The payment by the Transit Authority

and the Queens Private Lines was not and will not be reflected in the
lourly wage rate of their employees.

No present, retroactive, or future

increase in their base hourly rate resulted.
Therefore, an amount of money paid as a "lump sum" and money
that increases the base hourly rates are manifestly different.
short, the "lump sum"

or single, non-recurring

In

payment by the Transit

Authority and the Queens Private Lines was not an increase in the hourly
rate or hourly wage rate of their employees, and therefore not an
increase that qualifies for payment under the contract to the grievants
in this case.

(Indeed there is evidence in the record that at one set of

negotiations the Company expressly informed the Union that the present
contract language was negotiated to "protect" the Company against payment
of "bonuses," or compensation not reflected in a percentage increase in
oase rates) . Confined to the contract as negotiated and written by the
parties, a different interpretation by the Arbitrator would be beyond his
authority.

Considering

the compelling differences, the parties should

lave

and would

have negotiated

other

language

if they

intended base

lourly rate and lump sum to be synonymous.
This is not to say that the Impartial Chairman does not have
some personal views about this case.

Bluntly, he is sympathetic to and

appreciates the reasons why the Union and the employees believe they are
entitled to the payment.
the

Transit

ompany's

and

Queens

employees

Historically there has been wage parity with
Private

even

Lines

enjoyed

employees.

wages

greater

At
than

one

time

parity.

the
The

grievants are the only private line employees who were not paid the lump
sum.

Apparently other employers with similar contract language paid it

either for equitable reasons or other pragmatic considerations.
grievants

not

to

receive

it, puts

them

now

behind

others

For the
similarly

situated in gross earnings.

The contract language can be alternatively

interpreted

to maintain

as

an

intention

parity

with

Transit

and the

Queens Private Lines regardless of the nature or form of the increase in
compensation. And the amount of the lump sum if granted the grievants,
some

acknowledged

reimbursement

from

the

Department

of

Transportation of the City of New York, and tax deductions, would not be
that

onerous,

especially

if

spread

over

an

extended

period

without

interest.
But, I restate the well-settled rule.
the

Union

language
listory,

is
is

applicable

unclear

and

alternative

onsiderations

and

relevant

when

the

dispositive

ambiguous.

Then,

language

interpretations

are material

language is to be clarified.

past

The case advanced by

to how the unclear

practice,

contract

negotiation

and

or ambiguous

equitable
contract

But these arguments are of no probative

\7alue or use when, as here, the contract language is clear, unambiguous

7

and so well understood as written.
quities

of

this

impressiveness
interpretation

case

of

notwithstanding

the

of the

So, my personal feelings about the

Union's

contract,

and

no

equitable

the

clear

matter

the

arguments

language

otherwise

or

varied

of the contract,

supportive of the Company's position, may not be impeached.

The Union's

ause of action is for collective bargaining, not arbitration.
Finally, the Impartial Chairman takes arbitral notice of the
fact that the City of New York (D.O.T.) would reimburse the Company in
the amount of about $180,000 if the Company granted the lump sum increase
to the express bus personnel. And the City would not object if that
$180,000 was apportioned among all the grievants.
Therefore,

I

recommend

that

the

Union

and

the

Company

negotiate together and with the City of New York to try to agree on a
methodology under which the $180,000 could be obtained from the City for
distribution

to the grievants, equally, pro

rata or otherwise.

The

Impartial Chairman is willing to participate in those negotiations and
discussions if the parties and the City agree.

If such an arrangement

could be worked out that is acceptable to the Union, the Company and the
ity, roughly about one-half of what would have been the total lump sum
payment would be distributable to eligible employees.

The

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

Collective

Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The Company is not contractually obligated to make
the

one-time

non-recurring

lump

sum

payment

to

each employee that the Transit Authority and the
Queens Private Lines granted to their employees in
December 1997.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

January 12, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss :

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
CASE #13 300 0082599

LOCAL 814 IBT

-andMOVERS & WAREHOUSEMEN'S ASSOCIATION
OF GREATER NEW YORK, INC. and MOVING
& STORAGE JOINT LABOR MANAGEMENT BOARD
-X

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the
Union's grievance dated April 27, 1999?
A hearing was held on October 5, 1999, at which time
representatives of the above-named Union and Association
appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Union's grievance of April 27, 1999 reads, in
pertinent part:
"The Union claims that travel time is
payable to employees working on the N.Y.
City portion of a move to or from N.Y.
City on the one hand, and Westchester,
Nassau or Suffolk on the other hand.
The Association claims that travel time
is not payable to employees working on
the N.Y. City portion of a move to or
from N.Y. City on the one hand, and
Westchester, Nassau or Suffolk on the
other hand.
The Joint Board is deadlocked on this
issue."

More specifically, the parties seek an interpretation
of Article 12 H of the collective bargaining agreement, which
reads:

f

Commercial moving between points within
Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester
Counties, between New York City and
Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester
Counties, and between Nassau, Suffolk
and Westchester Counties, shall be at
Metropolitan District rates for time
consumed on actual moves and no travel
time will be paid, except for Chauffeurs
who will be paid portal to portal.
Travel time will be paid for normal
pick-ups and deliveries. Disputes shall
be referred to the Joint Board.
Commercial work within the Metropolitan
District by Employers located outside
said area shall be at Metropolitan
District rates, straight time for
travelling to and from the job. On
commercial work within Suffolk County
under this paragraph meal and bed money
shall be furnished when applicable.
Travel time of one half hour shall be
paid each way to and from all commercial
work within New York City, both straight
time and overtime.

It is undisputed that the "move" involved under the facts in this
case was a "commercial move" within the definition set forth in
C6 of the Definitions section of the contract.
The move was from New York City to Westchester County,
over approximately a two-week period.

The Union's claim is on

behalf of the employee helpers on that particular job.
However, both sides made clear that they seek a
"declaratory judgement" on the interpretation of Article 12 H,

applied not only to the particular facts in this case, but to
other similar circumstances.
For "declaratory judgement" purposes, I deem the issue
to be whether on a commercial move from New York City to
Westchester, Nassau or Suffolk Counties, (or visa versa) the
helpers on the job are entitled or not entitled to travel time
(i.e., travel pay)
I conclude that the answer lies within the four corners
of Article 12 H.; that despite the differing interpretations of
the parties, that Article is clear and unambiguous.
*•
The Union relies, primarily on the last sentence, which
reads:
"Travel time of one half hour shall be
paid each way to and from all commercial
work within New York City, both straight
time and overtime."
The Union's reliance is misplaced.

The foregoing last

sentence must be read as part of and in conjunction with the
language of Article 12 H that precedes it.

A reading of the

prior language makes clear, in my view, that commercial moving
between New York City and the Counties of Westchester, Nassau and
Suffolk precludes the payment of travel time; and that the last
sentence expressly provides for the payment of travel time for
commercial moves within New York City or in other words a move
that originate and finishes within New York City.
interpretation would Article 12 H make sense.

Under no other

The answer to the issue and facts of this case is
explicitly found in the first sentence of Article 12 H.

It

provides unambiguously and unconditionally that commercial moves
from New York City to Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk Counties or
from those Counties to New York City will be paid at the
Metropolitan District rates.
"...for time consumed
no travel time will
chauffeurs who will
portal...." (emphasis

on actual moves and
be paid, except for
be paid portal to
added)

This explicit language clearly denies the payment of
travel time to helpers on commercial moves of the type and under
the facts stipulated in this case.
The exception, namely the next sentence, provides for
travel time for work that is not a commercial move, but rather a
"pick up and delivery."

The work in the instant case and for

purposes of the declaratory judgement, was stipulated as
"commercial work" within the contract definition thereof, and not
"pick up and delivery."
What then does the last sentence mean?
Obviously, to my mind, it cannot be interpreted to
negate or even conflict with the foregoing explicit

prohibition

on the payment of travel time, but rather must apply to a
different circumstance.

In other words, contract language that

may appear to be in conflict should be reconciled, if possible,
for the obvious reason that the negotiating parties would not
have intended to write conflicting or mutually contrary contract

4

language.

But rather that the contract provisions in question

were both intended to apply and to be enforceable.

And to do so,

they must relate to different conditions or circumstances.
That is exactly the case here, in my judgement.

A

reconciliation is logical, apparent and sensible.
The last sentence applies, manifestly in my view, to
commercial moves that originate and finish within New York City.
The language of that sentence says so.

It provides for the

payment of travel time (i.e. one half hour each way) "...to and
from all commercial work within New York City...."
«•
added)

(emphasis

The work "within" means that the work, both its
beginning, ending, and in between, is located and confined to New
York City.
Indeed, the dictionary definition of "within" supports
this conclusion.

"Within" is defined as:

"enclosed or confined";
"to be found inside";
"enclosure or containment."
Webster 3rd New International
& Dictionary
Therefore, payment of travel time for a commercial move
is authorized and required by the last sentence of Article 12 H
for moves that take place in their entirety in New York City.
And not to commercial moves either way between New York City and
Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk Counties.

With the foregoing interpretation and application of
Article 12 H as clear and unambiguous, I need not deal with the
negotiation history of that Article or practices, if any,
thereunder.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance of April 27, 1999,
is denied.

Eric J./Schmertz,Arbitrator
DATED:

November 1, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
CASE #12 300 0016299

DISTRICT LODGE 91, I.A.M.A.W.
-andPRATT & WHITNEY
x

The stipulated issue is:
"Did the Company have just cause to
terminate FRANK WOOD on February 3, 1999
for falsification of Company records? If
not, what shall the remedy be?"
Hearings were held on June 25, July 9 and July 13,
1999, at which time Mr. Wood, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

A stenographic record of the hearings was taken and

both side filed a post-hearing brief.
The grievant is accused of falsifying a work report.
More specifically, the Company charges him with reporting and
certifying the performance and completion of preventative
maintenance checks on hoist #340279, when in fact, he and his
assigned partner did none of the assigned work.

The Company asserts that his falsification was a
willful violation of Rule #13 of its General Rules.

Said rule

reads:
"Recording another person's badge,
altering or mutilating a badge,
falsifying any job ticket, data
collection entry, or Company record, or
giving false information to anyone whose
duty it is to make such records..."
(emphasis added)
The Introduction to the General Rules, including Rule
#13 states:
"The following practices are strictly
forbidden,"
and concludes with the statement:
"violation...is proper cause for
disciplinary action, including
dismissal."
The Company asserts that it has consistently imposed
the disciplinary penalty of summary dismissal for violations of
Rule #13.
Though the grievant denies the charge, claiming he and
his partner performed the work as assigned on January 30th, the
weight of the credible evidence points otherwise and supports the
Company's allegation that the work has not done by the grievant,
either on January 30th or on any subsequent date.
Company supervisory witnesses testified in detail about
the condition of the hoist upon investigation of their suspicions
that the report the grievant and his partner was untrue.

That

testimony specified that some of the assigned work could not be
done without the disabling of the elective brake by an
electrician, and that the brake had not been disabled; that the
drum and wire rope had not been cleaned and lubricated; that the
load block and trolley wheels showed no evidence of new grease;
that the gear cases had not been removed or the oil changed, and
that the metal bumper remained loose and held with tape.
Also, the unrefuted testimony disclosed that congestion
on the floor area around the hoist was unchanged and that
performance of the work with that congestion remaining, or at
*•
least without rearrangement it, was impossible.
Finally, the testimony included that of a bargaining
unit electrician who would have deactivated the electrical
equipment on the hoist, if the work was done.

His testimony was

that electrical work was not done on that hoist.
There is no evidence whatsoever that any of these
witnesses, including the bargaining unit electrician who had been
subpoenaed, bore any animus toward the grievant or for any reason
would bear false witness against him.
I find the foregoing testimony to be accurate and
convincing, and therefore persuasive contradiction of the
grievant's denials.
A photograph was produced showing the grievant and his
partner on the hoist (apparently in an effort to show that they
were on the job) turned out to be immaterial.

Claiming that it

was taken on January 30th (when the work was to be performed) the
evidence in the record shows, to my satisfaction, that it was
taken on a subsequent day, probably the following Monday.

As an

after event, the photograph proves nothing of probative value
regarding what was done or not done on January 30th when the work
was supposed to be done and when the grievant certified that he
had done it.
Indeed, the evidence established that the preventative
maintenance check on that hoist was not done until the next
scheduled maintenance cycle, some weeks later.
That the Company left the preventative maintenance work
on the hoist until the next cycle was a managerial decision which
may or may not have had an effect on the use or safety of the
hoist.

But it does not excuse the grievant's untruthful report

nor does it constitute a waiver of the rule
falsification of records.

prohibiting

The issue in this case is not whether

the grievant's failure to perform the work created a safety
hazard, (arguably excusing his falsification because the Company
tolerated the condition for weeks), but rather and simply whether
the grievant committed a record falsification.

For here, the

falsification was a direct claim by the grievant for credit and
pay for work not done.

That, in and of itself is misconduct

within the meaning and purpose of Rule #13.
As I have concluded that the evidence shows that
neither the grievant nor his partner did any work in the hoist,

and knew that they did not, there can be no factual basis for the
grievant's claim that he thought his partner did some work that
later turned out not to have been done.
The grievant's express and written certification that
he performed work he did not do, is a falsification of Company
records within the proscription of Rule #13.

The Company has met

its burden of establishing the grievant's offense by the
requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence.
As to the penalty of discharge, the Union argues that
the grievant's 26 years of service and "unblemished" record
should be taken into consideration, and that if the charge is
upheld the penalty should be less than dismissal.
Though this arbitrator may personally think that
suspension and monetary reimbursement of pay for work not
performed may have been an adequate penalty for an employee with
26 years of service, it is not within the arbitrator's

authority

to reduce the penalty of discharge if the penalty is for just
cause and not arbitrary or unreasonable.

In other words, where

the penalty of discharge is historically and contractually
applicable and is not excessive for the offense committed, the
arbitrator should not substitute his personal views on what he
thinks would have been adequate, for the Company's right to
discipline more severely.
Here, there is an unchallenged rule prohibiting
falsification of records.

The rule has no exceptions, including

length of service.

It cannot be judged unreasonable or arbitrary

if willful falsification is proved.

Most significantly, the

rule, well known and well disseminated to the employees and the
Union, has been consistently applied to cases similar to this one
and the penalty of discharge has been consistently imposed,
regardless of the affected employee's longevity.
With that history, I cannot find that the type of
record falsification in this case, its willful nature, the clear
and convincing weight of the evidence in support of the charge,
and the consistent practice of enforcing a rule against
falsification of records with the penalty of dismissal,

compels

any modification of the penalty in this case.
Accordingly, the discharge of the grievant was for just
cause and is upheld.
With the foregoing decision, which not only upholds the
discharge, but perhaps more importantly upheld the Company's
right to impose summary dismissal for record falsification, this
arbitrator wishes to do something he does rarely, but from timeto-time where circumstances warrant.
recommendation.

And that is to make a

My recommendation in no way changes the Award in

this case and is offered for the discretionary consideration of
the Company, without prejudice to the Award and without

prejudice

to or precedent for any future like matter.
The recommendation for the Company to consider is that
because of the grievant's long service of 26 years, and his prior

record of non-discipline and satisfactory work, his discharge be
reduced to a lengthy suspension, either for the period of time
since his discharge or beyond for a further period to be fixed by
the Company.

And that thereafter he be restored to employment

without any back pay.

I would also include the deduction of a

some of money from his pay equal to what he was paid for the work
he did not do.

Any such suspension, implemented by the Company

should be deemed a "final chance," and that a future rule
violation by the grievant would be grounds for his immediate
discharge.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
have been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of FRANK WOOD was for just
cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

October 1, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

}

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ADMINISTRATOR

ASSOCIATION,
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
Between
STATE VOCATIONAL FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS

OPINION AND AWARD
Case# 12 390 0022097

-andSTATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance of MAUREEN BUECHLER arbitrable?
A

hearing

was

at

the

offices

of

the American

Arbitration

Association in East Hartford, Connecticut on October 29, 1997 at which
time

Ms.

Buechler,

representatives

of

hereinafter
the

concerned were afforded
and to examine
administered.

referred

above-named Union

to

as

the

and

Employer

"grievant"

and

appeared.

All

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument

and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's

Oath was

The parties filed post-hearing briefs and reply briefs.

Based on the record before me, and without any determination
on

the

merits,

contractual
violations

I

find

definition
reasonably

of

that
a

relate

the

grievant' s

"grievance";
to

certain

that

grievance
its

specific

meets

alleged

provisions

the

contract
of

the

contract within the parameters prescribed by the Steelworker Trilogy;1
that the contract including the management rights clause does not bar
the arbitrability
the

instant

grievance

of

of claimed violations of those provisions;

grievance

is

Antoinette

arbitrable following

sufficiently
Maguire

(which

different

from

ultimately

was

the

and that
earlier

held

non-

one arbitration, the vacating of its decision by

the court and a second arbitration) to remove it from the application of
the principles of res judicata, stare decisis and estoppel.
The pertinent parts of the grievant's grievance read:
Specific Contract Provision(s) violated:

Art. 21. S. 1A & 2; Art 7
Sect. 2 all subsections
Statement of Grievance:
Grievant force {sic} to provide coverage
without
remuneration
due
to
inadequate
employer preparation of substitute list.
Remedy Requested:
Cease and desist from future violations of
this
language.
Coverage
and
viable
substitute coverage list.

Namely "ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a
claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the
moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract
interpretation..." (i. e. the merits E.J.S.) (emphasis added) United
Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co. 363 U.S. 564, 80
S. Ct 1343, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403 (1960).

Article 21 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement

defines a

grievance as "a complaint that:
1)

There
has
been
a
violation,
misinterpretation
or
improper
application of a specific provision(s)
of the Agreement; or

2)

An employee has been treated unfairly
and/or inequitably by reason of an act
or condition which
is contrary to
established policy or practice governing
or affecting employees."

The contract sections alleged in the grievance to have been
violated are "Articles 21, Sec. 1A and 2 and Article 7, Section 2 ( all
ubsections) . "
Clearly, the grievance on its face alleges contract violations
that fit within the language of Section 1 (a) (1) and (2) of Article 21.
Subject of course, to evidentiary proof, the grievance complains that
the requirement

that the grievant, a Department head, fill in for and

perform the duties of an instructor in the PNEP program when the regular
instructor was out due to illness, was "a violation, misinterpretation
or improper application of a specific provision(s) of the Agreement,"
or...was "unfair or inequitable treatment by reason of an act or condition
which is contrary to policy or practice governing affected employees."
It is for the merits of the case, not part of an arbitrability
determination, to decide whether the Union and the grievant have proved
the alleged violations.

But, the allegations, based on the bare facts

of

the grievance,

set forth a claim which absent

any other bar, is

eligible for submission to arbitration under Section 6 of Article 21.
The
Section 2.

same is true with regard to the citation of Article 7

Apparently, the grievant and the Union are alleging that the

instructional

coverage

required

of

Coverage language of the contract.
ategory

of

employees

the

grievant

violated

the

Class

And that she did not fall within the

or classifications

that could

be

so

assigned.

Again, subject to proof in a hearing on the merits, I cannot conclude
that an allegation of a violation of Article 7 Section 2 is so remote
from or unrelated to the bare facts of the grievance as to hold that it
cannot

be

argued

substantively

as part

of

the

Union's

case

on the

merits.

Indeed, on its face, the grievance when compared with the bare

factual

allegations

establishes

a

sufficient

nexus

between

the

allegations and that Article and Section of the contract to permit the
allegation

to

be

put

to

the

evidentiary

test

of

a

hearing

on

the

•nerits.2
Again of course,
[Jnion

to

show

that

the

on the merits, the burden will be on the

grievant' s

"forced"

assignment

violated

the

"An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
lause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage"
(emphasis
added) United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.
363 U.S. 574, 805 ct. 1347 4 L. Ed. 2nd 1409 (1960).

various alternative methods of covering for an absent classroom or shop
instructor.
Nor do I find a bar to the arbitration of the grievance by the
language of the Board Prerogatories clause of the contract.
The Employer asserts that Article 2 vests it with the right to
"assign" faculty and that that right was exercised in the grievant's
case.
Clearly
unrestricted.

however,

the

right

to

"assign"

faculty

is

not

By its own express terms Article 2 vests the Employer

with certain specified "rights, powers, functions and authority except
as

limited by

"assign"

this Agreement"

faculty

with the proviso

(emphasis added) .

And

(along with other specified actions)

the

right

to

is conditioned

"provided such actions are not inconsistent with the

pecific terms of this Agreement" (emphasis added).
Here, the grievant and the Union assert that the Employer's
action

in

specified
Article 7.
and

the

ontractual

"assigning"
terms of

the grievant

the

to instructional

contract, namely

portions

duties violated

of Article

21 and

That assertion, based on an arguable relatedness between it
contract

provisions

exceptions

to

claimed

exclusive

violated,
and

falls

unchallengeable

within

the

managerial

authority, and makes permissible the referral of the allegations to the
grievance

procedure

and

to

arbitration.

And

again,

whether

the

allegations are dismissed or upheld are matters for determinations on
the merits and are not considered in deciding arbitrability.
However, the major thrust of the Employer's position in this
ase is that the instant grievance
decided

with

arbitration
asserts

finality
of

that

the

by

the arbitration, court

grievance

substantively

is not arbitrable because

of

the

Antoinette
instant

it was

action, and

Maguire.

grievance

puts

The
in

second

Employer
dispute

precisely the same issue that was decided in the Employer's favor in the
Maguire grievance proceedings and that based on the principles of rejudicata, state decisis and estoppel the instant grievance should be
foreclosed from arbitration.
For purposes of arbitrability, and again without any reference
to or determination of the merits, I find that the instant grievance is
sufficiently different from the Maguire grievance to remove it from the
application of res judicata, stare decisis and estoppel.
The grievants are different -- Ms. Buechler in the instant
case, and Ms. Maguire in the prior one.

Standing alone, and in the

light of the universally recognized principle that a different plaintiff
i.e. grievant) is entitled to his or her "day in court," the theory of
res judicata is inapposite.

The more so, of course, if the cause(s) of

action in a subsequent case is different from a prior case upon which
the assertion of res judicata rests.

Here I find different causes of actions or, in arbitral terms,
different

theories

of contract breach.

The Maguire grievance, which

also involved the involuntary assignment of a Department Head to cover
an

instructional

vacancy,

protested

the

lack

of

extra

pay

for that

assignment.
The pertinent part of the stipulated issue in the Maguire case
was:
"Did the Employer violate Article 6(3)(a)(3)
or Article 7(2)(a)(1)(2) or (3) when it
denied payment of contractual premiums to the
grievant for service rendered during the
clinical cycle in the period September 21,
1992 through November 5, 1992?..." (emphasis
added)
The Maguire grievance sought as the remedy:
"Paid {sic} for covering the following days
in clerical..."
The instant grievance cites the lack of additional pay, but
protests the assignment duty itself.
It seeks as a remedy:
"Cease and desist from future violations of
this
language.
Coverage
and
viable
substitute coverage list."

In short, the cease and desist remedy sought in the instant
grievance makes clear that the grievance does not include a demand for
payment

for instructional

services, a matter decided favorably

to the

Employer by the Maguire proceeding, but rather is limited to a challenge

to

the

assignment

instructor,

an

of

issue

a
not

Department

Head

probatively

to

cover

determined

for
by

an

the

absent
Maguire

proceedings.
Therefore, with different causes of action, different contract
violation theories, and different remedies sought, I find no basis, in
judging

threshold

arbitrability,

to

apply

the

principle

of

stare

decisis, notwithstanding the fact that the relevance of stare decisis is
discretionary with and not mandatory on a subsequent arbitrator.
All the foregoing is not to say that the instant grievance is
not substantively the same as the Maguire grievance, only superficially
"recast" to pass arbitrability "muster" and therefore subject to one or
more of the estoppel theories advanced by the Employer.

Rather it is to

say that that or those questions in this case and any such determination
would require a look at the merits of the grievance, a procedure not
within the scope of a threshold arbitrability decision.3

On that and

those theories the Employer's rights are reserved for when and if the
instant grievance is heard on the merits.

For example, it would require a consideration of the merits to find, in
support of the Employer's contention, that Article 7, held inapplicable
by the prior Arbitrator to the Maguire cause of action was also
inapplicable to the instant cause of action.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
oeen duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
Confined to a challenge to the assignment of
the grievant to instructional duties in the
PNEP program and to the remedy of a "cease
and desist" order, the grievance of Maureen
Buechler is arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Arbitrator
DATED:

February 27, 1998

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss :

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- SUBURBAN' PARATRANSIT
SERVICE, INC.
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

AWARD AND OPINION

-and-

SUBURBAN PARATRANSIT SERVICE, INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by failing to
conduct hearings with the Union
regarding the decertification of an
employee by the County, resulting in
his/her removal from paratransit
service with a consequent reduction in
pay hours?

If so, what shall be the

remedy?
A hearing was held on February 26, 1999 at which time
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The arbitrator's Oath

was waived.
The answer to the issue turns on whether there has been
agreement on the integration or inclusion of one particular
section of the contract between the Union and the White Plains
Bus Company into the contract between the parties to this
dispute.

There is no dispute that there is a integrated
corporate structure between White Plains Bus and Suburban
Paratransit.
Additionally, and determinative for this case, I find that
Section 15(H) of the White Plains collective agreement was, by
agreement of the above parties, incorporated into and made an
effective part of the collective agreement between the Union and
Suburban Paratransit.
That Section reads:
(H) In cases in which an employee is
suspended by operation of a
Decertification as defined in Section
15(E) of this Agreement, the Employer
agrees to discuss the matter with the
authorized representative(s) of the
School District in an attempt to
adjust the matter. If the Employer
shall be unsuccessful in its efforts
to adjust the matter such that the
Decertification is rescinded,
representatives of the Employer and
the Union shall confer for the purpose
of confirming that such
Decertification has in fact occurred.
The employee so decertified shall not
be entitled, through the use of this
Section 15, to further contest such
decertification or his/her resulting
dismissal.
The testimony and evidence shows that the full
foregoing procedure was not followed.

The Company did "discuss

the matter with the authorized representative(s) of the School
District in an attempt to adjust the matter such that the
Decertification is rescinded."

But, having been "unsuccessful

in its efforts," the Company failed to follow the next step.

It

did not "confer" with the Union "for the purpose of confirming
that such Decertification has in fact occurred."

Consequently,

the "employee so decertified" did not have the opportunity or
benefit of Union representation in that overlooked step in the
process.
I am not persuaded that the parties agreed to this
process for no reason.

It is clearly a matter of due process,

to which the affected employee and the Union on his/her behalf
are entitled.
For the Company's "short-circuiting" of the
contractual process, some remedy is appropriate.

The remedy I

shall fashion and which I deem appropriate and reasonable shall
be an Order directing the Company to follow the aforesaid
process in its entirety in future Decertification cases and a
monetary award to the Union, for and on behalf of affected
employee(s).
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said
parties, make the following Award:
The Company is directed prospectively
to fully comply with the aforesaid
Article 15(H).
The Company shall pay to the Union, for
and on behalf of affected employee(s)
the sum of Two Thousand ($2,000) Dollars
as consideration for its failure to do
so in this case.

chmertz, Impainiial Chairman

DATED:

March 12, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS CO.,
INC.
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

AWARD AND OPINION

-and-

WHITE PLAINS BUS CO., INC.
V"

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of CLIVE WALLACE?

If not, what shall

be the remedy?
A hearing was held on February 26, 1999 at the
ompany's offices at which time Mr. Wallace, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
ross-examine witnesses.

The arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant, a school bus driver was discharged for
the offense of leaving a child unattended on the school bus he
drove.

That the child was so left unattended (and presumably

asleep) when the grievant ended his run and/or departed from the
ous, is undisputed.
I have previously and consistently held that
onsidering a driver's special duty to maintain the safety of the
school children he drives and because of the particular notice

the Company has given drivers regarding their responsibility to
check buses for sleeping children and the absolute prohibition on
leaving a child on a bus unattended, the penalty of summary
dismissal is proper.
In that regard, my prior Award (In re: Frank Benedetto)
is precedent.

In that case, as in the instant case, Mr.

Benedetto left a child unattended on his bus at the end of his
run.

In that case, in upholding Benedetto's discharge based on

the Company's rule proscribing that offense, I stated:
"...the Company has established a
valid, bonafide reason for the rule it
has promulgated; and noticed it
properly; and has mandated a penalty
that reasonably "fits the offense";
and that
"... it cannot be said that the penalty
of discharge for leaving a child
unattended on a bus is inappropriate
or unreasonable."
However, as in the Benedetto case, the grievant has had
a good record as a school bus driver over a respectable period of
employment.

I think, because of that good record, the Company

should consider giving him another chance to maintain his
mployment.

Therefore, without prejudice to the validity and

continued enforceability of the Company's rule and without

precedent for any future matters, I recommend that the Company
consider, in its sole discretion, the grievant's reemployment
without back pay on a "last chance basis."
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement and having duly heard the proof
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
Award:
There was just cause for the discharge
of CLIVE WALLACE.

Eric J. 2fchmertz, Impartial (Chairman

DATED:

March 11, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss :

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
xecuted this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TWUA -andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO., INC.
V

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

WHITE PLAINS BUS CO., INC.
x

The stipulated issue is:
Did

the

vacation

Company
accruals

disability leave?

improperly
to

deny

employees

on

If so, what shall be

the remedy?
A hearing was held on November 4, 1999

at which time

representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
concerned

were

argument

and

afforded
to

full opportunity

examine

and

to offer

cross-examine

All

evidence and

witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievants in this case are employees on disability
leaves of absence, who, as a vacation benefit,
vacation pay

only

received

for time actively worked during

pro-rata

the vacation

year, and not for any time during that period that they were on a
disability leave.
The Union asserts that they are entitled to the accrual
of vacation time and vacation pay for the entire period including
the time on disability leave.

The Company asserts that vacation accruals and vacation
pay

are conditioned on the periods of active service during the

vacation year and that leaves of absence, during which an employee
is not

actively

at work,

are

excluded

from

the

calculation

the

contract,

of

vacation entitlement for that vacation year.
Both

sides

rely

on

Section

particularly the fifth paragraph thereof.

8

of

With the pertinent part

of the fifth paragraph underscored below, Section 8 reads:
8.

and

VACATIONS

All employees covered by this Agreement
hall be entitled to two
(2) weeks
vacation
after six
(6) months
of
service, except that those employees
who are hired by mid-August of any year
in which this Agreement is applicable
(and
who
are
on
staff
at
the
commencement of the school year) shall
receive paid vacation as if they had
been employed for a period of six (6)
months.
This vacation
entitlement
shall be paid at Christmas break and
Summer break.
All employees with ten (10) years of
service shall receive three (3) weeks'
vacation, with payment for the third
week of vacation entitlement made at
Spring break.
All employees with twenty (20) years of
service shall receive four (4) weeks'
vacation, with payment for the fourth
week of vacation entitlement made at
Midwinter break.
Such vacation with pay shall be paid on
the same basis as it was paid prior to
the effective date of this Agreement.
Effective July 1, 1996, vacation with
pay
shall be based on
employees'
regularly picked/assigned runs (their
"regular rate") in the week before the
particular payments are due to be made.

The
above
schedule
of
vacation
entitlement
requires
continuous
employment.
Rehires with breaks in
employment
shall
have
vacation
entitlement calculated from the rehire
date.
Vacation must be taken in the
school year in which it is earned;
there shall be no carrying over of
vacation weeks. There shall be no pay
for
accrued,
unused
vacation
entitlement.
The

Union

fifth paragraph
other

breaks

disability

interprets

to mean

the

underscored

that except

in active employment,

leaves of absence,

language

for employees
including,

are periods

of

of the

rehired, all

as in this case,
time

during

which

vacation time is accrued.
The
argues

that

employment,
therefore

Company

advances

the language
thereby

the

"continuous

excluding

grievants

a different

employment"

leaves

did not

interpretation.

of

accrue

means

absence.

vacation

"active"
And

time

It

that

while

on

disability leave and were properly paid vacation time on a pro-rata
basis for the time they were actively employed.
Frankly,

I

am

inclined

to

interpret

"continuous

employment" as "active" employment.
Indeed,
interpretation.
regularly

the

fourth

paragraph

Section

8 supports

this

For if vacation pay "shall be based on employees'

picked/assigned

runs...in the week before the particular

payments are due to be made," I fail to see how that calculation
can be made for an employee on disability leave who has not been
actually at work on a regular "pick" or "assigned run."

Except, as

was done in this case, on a pro-rata basis for the time and period
actually worked.

But, I am not prepared to so hold definitively, based in
the record in this case.
I can see how the two sentences can be construed to mean
that the only "break" in employment excluded from vacation accrual
is the "break" between prior employment and later "rehire."
that therefore "continues

employment"

leave. On the other hand,
differently

related.

And

included time on disability

I can see how the two sentences
"Continuous

employment"

or

are

"active

employment" is required of all employees for vacation accruals, but
that "continuous employment" for an employee rehired, begins on the
date of rehire.

And that in either circumstance, active employment

is the required condition for vacation accrual.
So,

I

deem

the

critical

contract

language

ambiguous

susceptible to different interpretations.
It is well settled that ambiguous contract

language is

clarified by practice under it and/or by its negotiation history.
Unfortunately there is no probative evidence
case.

of

either

in this

The "evidence" of past practice, if any, relates to non-

bargaining

unit

employees,

and

hence

is

non-precedential.

No

evidence of the negotiation history of the Vacation clause of the
contract was adduced.
That being so, resolution of the issue turns on "burden
of proof."

The "burden" is on the Union to show that the contract

language supports its theory of this case.

But it has not offered

evidence that clarifies the ambiguity, so the inclusiveness of the
Union's case remains.
has not been met.

That means that the Union's burden of proof

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties,

and having

duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Company did not improperly deny
vacation
accruals
to employees
on
disability leave.

Eric J./Schmertz, Impartral Chairman

DATED:

November 19, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS CO.,
INC.
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

AWARD AND OPINION

-andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO., INC.
-X
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge
of ETTA DANIELS?

If not, what shall

be the remedy?

A hearing was held on June 10, 1999 at which time Ms.
Daniels, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The grievant, a school van driver, was discharged for
leaving a kindergarten student unattended on the van at the end
of her run on April 29, 1999.
The determinative facts in this case are substantively
the same as in the case of Frank Benedetto.

Accordingly, my

Award and Opinion in the Benedetto case is controlling precedent
for the instant matter.

As in Benedetto, the grievant was negligent in not
noticing the child's presence in the van and by not taking the
required steps, pursuant to an explicit Company rule, to check on
the presence of each child.

As in Benedetto, the grievant, who

had only 18 children on her van and who knew each one of them
because she had driven this school assignment for some time,
failed to identify the presence of each child by observation as
she called the roll; negligently and improperly relied on the
word of another five-year-old student that Kayla Toni (the child
left unattended) had gone home with her father, and wrongfully,
based on that misinformation, failed to make the stop at which
Kayla regularly left the bus.

And at the end of her run, upon

taking the van home, she again failed to check the van for a
sleeping child and to place the required sign that she had done
so at the back of the van.
Only when the dispatcher called the grievant at home to
report that Kayla's parents reported her missing did the grievant
check the van and find the child.
For the foregoing negligent acts; for a clear violation
of an explicit and well-publicized rule regarding the procedure
to follow to ensure that no child is left on a bus or van; and
because, again, explicitly and properly a violation of that rule
is a dischargeable offense, the discharge upheld in the Benedetto
case is equally appropriate and compelling in this case.

Indeed,

the "fiduciary" duty and responsibility of the Company and its

school bus (and van) drivers to transport school children safely,
as expressed by me in the Benedetto case are equally applicable
here and reiterated.
Accordingly, the Company had just cause to discharge
the grievant and her dismissal is upheld.
However, the Impartial Chairman wishes to make a
recommendation which is without prejudice to the validity and
continued enforceability of the Company's rule, without precedent
for any future matters and for the Company to consider in its
sole discretion.

Because of the grievant's twenty years of

service with the Company, her expressed apologies for the
incident involved in this case, and because she forthwith
returned Kayla unharmed to her family, I recommend that the
grievant be re-employed by the Company without back pay,
beginning with next years school year, driving a school van or
bus on a different route (or for a different school district) on
a "last chance basis."
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named parties,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties,
makes the following Award:
The discharge of ETTA DANIELS was for
just case.

Eric J. Schmertz, Impartial Chairman

DATED:

July 1, 1999

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

